Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00039-7MaRDI QIDQ1583469zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors M. R. Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm

Publication date 26 October 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

contractspenaltiesleveled commitment protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
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(5)

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