Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00039-7zbMATH Open0960.91047MaRDI QIDQ1583469FDOQ1583469

Authors: M. R. Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm 

Publication date: 26 October 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

contractspenaltiesleveled commitment protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
• Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
• Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents

Cited In (5)

• Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach
• Human-computer negotiation in three-player market settings
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents

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