Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01308-7zbMATH Open1479.91069OpenAlexW3089264626MaRDI QIDQ2059079FDOQ2059079

Authors: Sambuddha Ghosh, Yan Long, Manipushpak Mitra 

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7

Recommendations

• Reordering an existing queue
• When queueing is better than push and shove
• Mechanism design in queueing problems
• No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
• Group strategyproofness in queueing models

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceonline mechanism designdynamically strategy-proofonline VCG mechanismprior-free mechanism designqueueing with arrivals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• No-envy in queueing problems
• Group strategyproofness in queueing models
• Mechanism design in queueing problems
• Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
• Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
• Online algorithms: a survey
• An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• An Online Mechanism for Resource Allocation and Pricing in Clouds
• Competitive auctions and digital goods
• Competitive auctions
• Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
• No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• Balanced ranking mechanisms
• Reordering an existing queue
• A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
• An online mechanism for multi-unit demand and its application to plug-in hybrid electric vehicle charging
• Incentives and justice for sequencing problems

Cited In (4)

• On slots' scheduling
• When queueing is better than push and shove
• Mechanism design in queueing problems
• The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals

This page was built for publication: Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2059079)