Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01308-7MaRDI QIDQ2059079zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sambuddha Ghosh, Yan Long, Manipushpak Mitra

Publication date 13 December 2021

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceonline mechanism designdynamically strategy-proofonline VCG mechanismprior-free mechanism designqueueing with arrivals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7051298 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Reordering an existing queue
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
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Cited in

(4)

• On slots' scheduling
• When queueing is better than push and shove
• The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals
• Mechanism design in queueing problems

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