Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
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Publication:2059079
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7zbMath1479.91069OpenAlexW3089264626MaRDI QIDQ2059079
Manipushpak Mitra, Sambuddha Ghosh, Yan Long
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01308-7
budget balanceonline mechanism designdynamically strategy-proofonline VCG mechanismprior-free mechanism designqueueing with arrivals
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