Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.010zbMath1314.91123OpenAlexW1995945259MaRDI QIDQ2253832

Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan

Publication date: 13 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/20236/

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designrobust mechanism designmulti-item ascending auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

Cites Work

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