Introduction to computer science and economic theory
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2253830
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.002zbMath1314.91008MaRDI QIDQ2253830
Robert D. Kleinberg, Jon M. Kleinberg, Lawrence E. Blume, David A. Easley, Éva Tardos
Publication date: 13 February 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.002
00B15: Collections of articles of miscellaneous specific interest
68-06: Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to computer science
91-06: Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
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An introduction to mechanized reasoning, Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes, Economic reasoning with demand and supply graphs, Pathwise smooth splittable congestion games and inefficiency
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