Pricing lotteries

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.011zbMath1314.91108MaRDI QIDQ2253836

Robert D. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg, Shuchi Chawla, Patrick Briest

Publication date: 13 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.011

zbMATH Keywords

lotteries; revenue maximization; unit-demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

Related Items

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements, Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items, Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands, Introduction to computer science and economic theory, Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information, Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity, On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting, Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation

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