Pricing lotteries
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Publication:2253836
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.011zbMath1314.91108OpenAlexW4238495882MaRDI QIDQ2253836
Robert D. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg, Shuchi Chawla, Patrick Briest
Publication date: 13 February 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.011
Related Items (10)
Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing ⋮ On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer ⋮ Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
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