Haggling over substitutes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:707294
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.002zbMath1181.91117OpenAlexW2133387873MaRDI QIDQ707294
Publication date: 9 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.002
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (35)
Adaptive, anisotropic and hierarchical cones of discrete convex functions ⋮ Selling two identical objects ⋮ Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue ⋮ Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions ⋮ On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design ⋮ The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer ⋮ Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels ⋮ Asking price and price discounts: the strategy of selling an asset under price uncertainty ⋮ Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller ⋮ A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ Pricing lotteries ⋮ Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist ⋮ The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships ⋮ Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing ⋮ The role of optimal threats in auction design ⋮ Optimal sales mechanism with outside options ⋮ Screening by mode of trade ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ A note on optimal allocation mechanisms ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach ⋮ Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions ⋮ The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
Cites Work
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency
- Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
This page was built for publication: Haggling over substitutes
