Haggling over substitutes

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.09.002MaRDI QIDQ707294zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Thanassoulis

Publication date 9 February 2005

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingpricinglotteriesmultidimensional screeninghagglingoptimal selling strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
• Bundling information goods: pricing, profits, and efficiency
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

Cited in

(38)

• Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
• Selling two identical objects
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
• Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
• Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
• Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design
• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
• Selling two complementary goods
• The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
• A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem
• Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
• Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
• Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
• A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
• Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
• Multidimensional screening after 37 years
• A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization
• Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions
• Pricing lotteries
• Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
• The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
• Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
• Adaptive, anisotropic and hierarchical cones of discrete convex functions
• Asking price and price discounts: the strategy of selling an asset under price uncertainty
• Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
• A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Optimal sales mechanism with outside options
• On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer
• Screening by mode of trade

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