On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer
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Publication:5080487
DOI10.1137/17M1136481MaRDI QIDQ5080487FDOQ5080487
Authors: Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Anthi Orfanou, Xiaorui Sun, Mihalis Yannakakis, D. Paparas 
Publication date: 31 May 2022
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
- The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
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- Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization
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