On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_4MaRDI QIDQ2152104zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_4

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssymmetrymulti-dimensional ad auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7559076 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
• An \(n\)-to-\(1\) bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Fairness through awareness
• Haggling over substitutes
• Incentives in Teams
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer
• On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design
• Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• The complexity of optimal mechanism design
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

Cited in

(1)

• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces

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