On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design
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Publication:2152104
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_4OpenAlexW4206522224MaRDI QIDQ2152104FDOQ2152104
Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_4
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
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