On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design

zbMATH Open1403.91176arXiv1709.07955MaRDI QIDQ4608022FDOQ4608022

Authors: Si-Qi Liu, Christos-Alexandros Psomas 

Publication date: 15 March 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.07955

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zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designauctioncompetition complexity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (8)

• On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
• Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items
• On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
• A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Selling to multiple no-regret buyers
• Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer
• On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design
• Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality

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