Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items

DOI10.1145/3313276.3316405zbMath1437.91214arXiv1812.01794OpenAlexW2902767316MaRDI QIDQ5212809

S. Matthew Weinberg, Hedyeh Beyhaghi

Publication date: 30 January 2020

Published in: Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.01794

zbMATH Keywords

dualityauctionsstochastic dominancemulti-dimensional mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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