Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 920136 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3085498 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
- A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- An \(n\)-to-\(1\) bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Bounded rationality in individual decision making
- Generalized Gini inequality indices
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
- On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design
- Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Prospect theory. For risk and ambiguity.
- Quantile Maximization in Decision Theory*
- Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer
- Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences
- Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
- Separation in correlation-robust monopolist problem with budget
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
- The number of linear extensions of the Boolean lattice
- The value of information concealment
- When the players are not expectation maximizers
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