Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer

DOI10.1007/S00224-021-10054-9MaRDI QIDQ2147995zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Si-Qi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas

Publication date 21 June 2022

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-021-10054-9

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationprospect theoryauctionsrisk-robustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 920136 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3085498 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents
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• Quantile Maximization in Decision Theory*
• Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer
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• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
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• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
• The number of linear extensions of the Boolean lattice
• The value of information concealment
• When the players are not expectation maximizers

Cited in

(4)

• Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents
• Risk robust mechanism design for a prospect theoretic buyer
• Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer
• Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers

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