Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer
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Publication:2147995
DOI10.1007/S00224-021-10054-9zbMATH Open1493.91031OpenAlexW4232959094MaRDI QIDQ2147995FDOQ2147995
J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas, Si-Qi Liu
Publication date: 21 June 2022
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-021-10054-9
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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