On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
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Publication:5171012
DOI10.1073/pnas.1309533110zbMath1292.91086OpenAlexW2088970293WikidataQ37010594 ScholiaQ37010594MaRDI QIDQ5171012
Publication date: 25 July 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110
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Cites Work
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Optimal Auction Design
- Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate
