Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.003zbMath1497.91130arXiv1902.10315OpenAlexW2953266676MaRDI QIDQ2155888

Shuchi Chawla, Christos Tzamos, Yifeng Teng

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.10315

zbMATH Keywords

lotteriesrevenue maximizationsimple mechanismsmenu-size complexity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• Bounding the menu-size of approximately optimal auctions via optimal-transport duality
• An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
• Learning submodular functions

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