Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_9zbMath1401.91083arXiv1412.3187OpenAlexW2150609993MaRDI QIDQ3452771

MohammadHossein Bateni, Saeed Seddighin, Sina Dehghani, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.3187

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Selling two goods optimally ⋮ Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing ⋮ A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Pricing multi-unit markets ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• Optimal Auction Design
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• Matroid prophet inequalities
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items