Negative prices in network pricing games
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Publication:2670481
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2022.01.001OpenAlexW4206355971MaRDI QIDQ2670481FDOQ2670481
Authors: Andrés Cristi, Marc Schröder 
Publication date: 11 March 2022
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.08884
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