Negative prices in network pricing games
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Publication:2670481
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 420868 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3534506 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Stackelberg knapsack game with weight control
- A bilevel model of taxation and its application to optimal highway pricing
- An approximation algorithm for Stackelberg network pricing
- An overview of Stackelberg pricing in networks
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
- Excluding Braess's paradox in nonatomic selfish routing
- Matroids are immune to Braess' paradox
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
- On the Complexity of Stackelberg Matroid Pricing Problems
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- Parallel recognition of series-parallel graphs
- Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
- Stackelberg network pricing games
- Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate
- Stackelberg packing games
- Stackelberg shortest path tree game, revisited
- The Stackelberg minimum spanning tree game
- Toll caps in privatized road networks
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
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