Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.002zbMath1395.91240arXiv1311.5966OpenAlexW2567727810MaRDI QIDQ516055

Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang

Publication date: 20 March 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.5966

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanism designmenu representation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Selling two identical objects, Selling two goods optimally, The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer, Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items, A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer, Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations, On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting, On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist, Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity, Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Haggling over substitutes
• On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
• An optimal auction for complements
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
• A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms