An optimal auction for complements
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1357402
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0534zbMath0871.90022OpenAlexW1966404657MaRDI QIDQ1357402
Publication date: 10 June 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7bb0611ddda67936331a4bce59fdae9e5b38e396
Related Items (10)
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Optimal combinatorial mechanism design ⋮ Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Implementation in an interdependent value framework ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal Auction Design
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
This page was built for publication: An optimal auction for complements