Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2376381
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0700-8zbMath1282.90159OpenAlexW2027237750MaRDI QIDQ2376381
Publication date: 21 June 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/ulku/09-03.pdf
Related Items (3)
Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ Implementation in an interdependent value framework ⋮ Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- An optimal auction for complements
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods
- Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
- Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set
- A Fundamental Theorem of Calculus for Lebesgue Integration
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal Auction Design
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Efficient Auctions
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- An Efficient Auction
This page was built for publication: Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
