Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
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Publication:2016248
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1377418 (Why is no real title available?)
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
- All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Auctions in the electricity market. Bidding when production capacity is constrained
- Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
- Coarse Matching
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
- Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
- Position Auctions with Consumer Search
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Sponsored search auctions
Cited in
(25)- Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Common Value Auctions
- Generalized second price auctions over a network
- Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium in “linear” Cournot models with private information about costs
- Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
- Simultaneous ad auctions
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
- Equilibria of GSP for range auction
- Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
- An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions
- Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
- Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
- Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
- Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- Matching through position auctions
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
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