Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
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Publication:2016248
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.09.001zbMATH Open1296.91127OpenAlexW2029498092MaRDI QIDQ2016248FDOQ2016248
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.001
sponsored searchBayes-Nash equilibriumposition auctionsclick-through ratesgeneralized second-price auction
Cites Work
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Cited In (17)
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium in “linear” Cournot models with private information about costs
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Common Value Auctions
- Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
- Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction
- On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets
- An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions
- Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
- Generalized second price auctions over a network
- Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
- Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Matching through position auctions
- Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies
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