Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.12.003MaRDI QIDQ993785zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date 20 September 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsponsored searchgeneralized second-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Incentives in Teams
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

Cited in

(25)

• Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
• Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets
• Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
• Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
• Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
• Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
• Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
• A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
• Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
• Communication and efficiency in auctions
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker
• Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
• Two approximation algorithms for maximizing nonnegative weakly monotonic set functions
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Strategically simple mechanisms
• Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• Mechanism design with a restricted action space
• Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
• Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies
• Position auctions with multi-unit demands
• Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
• Efficient advert assignment
• To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions

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