Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003zbMath1201.91081OpenAlexW2154327930WikidataQ56481638 ScholiaQ56481638MaRDI QIDQ993785

Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsponsored searchgeneralized second-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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