Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Incentives in Teams
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
Cited in
(25)- Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
- Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
- Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
- Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
- A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
- Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Two approximation algorithms for maximizing nonnegative weakly monotonic set functions
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Strategically simple mechanisms
- Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
- Efficient advert assignment
- To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
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