Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
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Publication:993785
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.12.003zbMATH Open1201.91081OpenAlexW2154327930WikidataQ56481638 ScholiaQ56481638MaRDI QIDQ993785FDOQ993785
Authors: Paul R. Milgrom 
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
- Two approximation algorithms for maximizing nonnegative weakly monotonic set functions
- Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Near-Optimal Asymmetric Binary Matrix Partitions
- To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Efficient advert assignment
- Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
- Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets
- Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
- Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
- Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies
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