A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51903 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
- Boundedly rational backward induction
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Combinatorial auctions via posted prices
- Computational Complexity
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Essentially stable matchings
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Incentives in Teams
- Kidney Exchange
- Limited foresight may force cooperation
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
- Making just school assignments
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
- On cores and indivisibility
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Social choice and individual values
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Strategically simple mechanisms
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
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