A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

DOI10.3982/ECTA16310zbMATH Open1541.91025MaRDI QIDQ6536583FDOQ6536583

Authors: Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan 

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

limited foresightascending auctionsextensive-form gamesplanning horizon(strong) obvious strategy-proofnessone-step simplicityprice and priority mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cited In (2)

• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

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