An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0074zbMATH Open0861.90130OpenAlexW2131456298MaRDI QIDQ1815193FDOQ1815193

Authors: Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein 

Publication date: 7 November 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0074

Recommendations

• Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cited In (8)

• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation
• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
• Menu mechanisms
• Full implementation in backward induction
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
• Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty

This page was built for publication: An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1815193)