Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation

DOI10.1007/s00224-022-10071-2zbMath1493.91030OpenAlexW4226151584MaRDI QIDQ2147998

Carmine Ventre, Diodato Ferraioli

Publication date: 21 June 2022

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-022-10071-2

zbMATH Keywords

machine schedulingbounded rationalitymechanism designlookaheadsimple mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
• Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

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