Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation
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Publication:2147998
DOI10.1007/S00224-022-10071-2zbMATH Open1493.91030OpenAlexW4226151584MaRDI QIDQ2147998FDOQ2147998
Authors: Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre 
Publication date: 21 June 2022
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-022-10071-2
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Cites Work
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- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
- Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling
- Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
- Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
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