Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation

DOI10.1007/S00224-022-10071-2zbMATH Open1493.91030OpenAlexW4226151584MaRDI QIDQ2147998FDOQ2147998

Authors Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 21 June 2022

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-022-10071-2

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitymachine schedulingmechanism designlookaheadsimple mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3063363 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
• Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals
• Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• Verifiably truthful mechanisms

Cited in

(5)

• Obvious manipulations
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
• New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling

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