Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation

DOI10.1007/S00224-022-10071-2MaRDI QIDQ2147998zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 21 June 2022

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-022-10071-2

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitymachine schedulingmechanism designlookaheadsimple mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3063363 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
• Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals
• Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• Verifiably truthful mechanisms

Cited in

(5)

• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling
• New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
• Obvious manipulations
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium

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