Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
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Publication:1622367
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.07.001zbMATH Open1417.91379arXiv1511.00452OpenAlexW2963156391WikidataQ129520617 ScholiaQ129520617MaRDI QIDQ1622367FDOQ1622367
Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements a stable matching is "obviously strategy-proof" for any side of the market, a stronger incentive property than strategy-proofness that was introduced by Li (2017). A stable mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof for applicants is introduced for the case in which agents on the other side have acyclical preferences.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.00452
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Cited In (19)
- Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation
- Communication with evidence in the lab
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- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
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- A stable marriage requires communication
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- Menu mechanisms
- Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
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