Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.001zbMath1417.91379arXiv1511.00452OpenAlexW2963156391MaRDI QIDQ1622367

Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.00452

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmechanismstable matchingobvious strategy-proofnessobviously strategy-proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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