Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110002MaRDI QIDQ1984501zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Morteza Honarvar, Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Publication date 16 September 2021

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110002

zbMATH Keywords

large marketmarket designmatching theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Marriage, honesty, and stability
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Cited in

(18)

• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
• Quantile stable mechanisms
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
• Group robust stability in matching markets
• A limit to envy in large matching markets with incomplete information
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
• Manipulation via capacities revisited

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