Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1381985
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2316zbMath0892.90011OpenAlexW2009393148MaRDI QIDQ1381985
Publication date: 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/91646554995afc2fd3d21568d0fce5d04a32614e
Related Items (40)
Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Subgame perfect coalition formation ⋮ School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action ⋮ Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) ⋮ Manipulation via capacities revisited ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches ⋮ School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms ⋮ A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement ⋮ Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY ⋮ Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Manipulation via Endowments
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
