Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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Publication:1381985
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
Cited in
(43)- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Capacity design in school choice
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- A further note on the college admission game
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
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