The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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Publication:972135
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.005zbMath1229.91247OpenAlexW2139345328MaRDI QIDQ972135
Publication date: 25 May 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.005
Related Items (9)
The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
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