On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0573-yzbMath1411.91425OpenAlexW2593620830MaRDI QIDQ1684134

Marilda Sotomayor, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date: 8 December 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmanipulabilitycompetitive equilibriumcompetitive equilibrium ruleoptimal competitive equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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