Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
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Publication:1028549
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0366-4zbMATH Open1166.91005OpenAlexW1964887069MaRDI QIDQ1028549FDOQ1028549
Publication date: 6 July 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4
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Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Games of fair division
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- On cores and indivisibility
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods
- Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
Cited In (23)
- Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- EFFICIENT STRATEGY PROOF FAIR ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
- Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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