Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
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Publication:1028549
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Cites work
- A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Games of fair division
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentives in Teams
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
- On cores and indivisibility
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
Cited in
(29)- A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects
- EFFICIENT STRATEGY PROOF FAIR ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS
- Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5543436 (Why is no real title available?)
- Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679846 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
- Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
- An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
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