Strategy-proof coalition formation
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Publication:532687
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0162-9zbMATH Open1211.91047OpenAlexW2041650715MaRDI QIDQ532687FDOQ532687
Authors: Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.info/PDFS/E200611.pdf
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Cites Work
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Cited In (16)
- Coalition formation problems with externalities
- Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
- Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
- Strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable and fractional hedonic games
- Forming Plurality at Minimum Cost
- Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games
- Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
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