Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2021.103610MaRDI QIDQ2060745zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bojana Kodric, Giovanna Varricchio, Michele Flammini

Publication date 13 December 2021

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103610

zbMATH Keywords

friends and enemies gameshedonic gamesstrategyproof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Hedonic games
• Nash stable outcomes in fractional hedonic games: existence, efficiency and computation
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
• Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
• Strategy-proof coalition formation
• Strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable and fractional hedonic games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures

Cited in

(7)

• Strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games
• Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
• Strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable and fractional hedonic games
• Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences
• Relaxed core stability in hedonic games
• Stability in online coalition formation
• Formal verification and synthesis of mechanisms for social choice

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