On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2006.03.011zbMath1303.91035OpenAlexW2111493319MaRDI QIDQ2643787

Shao Chin Sung, Dinko Dimitrov

Publication date: 27 August 2007

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315475

zbMATH Keywords

coreadditivitycoalition formationco-NP completenesshedonic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

Altruistic Hedonic Games ⋮ Toward the complexity of the existence of wonderfully stable partitions and strictly core stable coalition structures in enemy-oriented hedonic games ⋮ Forming \(k\) coalitions and facilitating relationships in social networks ⋮ Nash stability in additively separable hedonic games and community structures ⋮ The trouble with the second quantifier ⋮ Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games ⋮ Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players ⋮ Computational complexity in additive hedonic games

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Computational complexity of stable partitions with b-preferences
• Stable partitions with \(\mathcal W\)-preferences
• NP-completeness in hedonic games
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

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