Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0879-2zbMATH Open1341.91012OpenAlexW2038792974MaRDI QIDQ904830FDOQ904830

Authors: Hakan İnal 

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Coalition formation and stability
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

Cited In (22)

• Solidarity to achieve stability
• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
• Core tâtonnement
• Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
• The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games
• A reference point approach to coalition games
• Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
• On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Robust equilibria in tournaments
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
• Core of Coalition Games on MV-algebras
• An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games
• NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
• Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
• New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules
• On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

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