Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
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Publication:705860
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.004zbMath1093.91003MaRDI QIDQ705860
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1537.pdf
Related Items
Strategy-proof coalition formation, Dynamic coalitional equilibrium, Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion, Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games, Bargaining cum voice, The stability of hedonic coalition structures, Formation of segregated and integrated groups, The strategy structure of some coalition formation games, Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems, The core-partition of a hedonic game
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