Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
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Publication:705860
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.004zbMath1093.91003OpenAlexW2070220449MaRDI QIDQ705860
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1537.pdf
Related Items (25)
The core-partition of a hedonic game ⋮ Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Formation of segregated and integrated groups ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Coalition formation problems with externalities ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) ⋮ Robust equilibria in tournaments ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ Subordinated hedonic games ⋮ Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems ⋮ Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching ⋮ The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games ⋮ Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ Strategy-proof coalition formation ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ The stability of hedonic coalition structures ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Matching with ownership
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