Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0538-6zbMath1398.91038OpenAlexW2411746227MaRDI QIDQ2398186

Karl Jandoc, Ruben Juarez

Publication date: 15 August 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0538-6

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationself-enforcementpower accumulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation, Robust equilibria in tournaments, An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

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