Power fluctuations and political economy

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.11.002zbMath1246.91075MaRDI QIDQ548249

Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61784

zbMATH Keywords

political economy; commitment problem; dynamic political economy; Olson-McGuire hypothesis; political compromise; political power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91B62: Economic growth models

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions, Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics, Public information in Markov games, Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies

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