Power fluctuations and political economy

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.11.002zbMath1246.91075OpenAlexW2162404868MaRDI QIDQ548249

Aleh Tsyvinski, Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61784

zbMATH Keywords

political economycommitment problemdynamic political economyOlson-McGuire hypothesispolitical compromisepolitical power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (8)

Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation ⋮ Public information in Markov games ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies ⋮ The envelope theorem, Euler and Bellman equations, without differentiability ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Dynamic relational contracts under complete information ⋮ Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics

Cites Work

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• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

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