Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
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Cites work
- A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy
- Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
- Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- Fiscal rules and discretion under persistent shocks
- Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation *
- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
- Microeconomic theory
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- On the Faustian dynamics of policy and political power
- Political Economy of Mechanisms
- Politicians, taxes and debt
- Power fluctuations and political economy
- Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth
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