Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

DOI10.2307/1884470zbMATH Open0436.90039OpenAlexW2137522380MaRDI QIDQ3877366FDOQ3877366

Authors: Thomas Römer, Howard Rosenthal 

Publication date: 1979

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1884470

zbMATH Keywords

political economypublic expendituremonopoly modelreferendum votingresource allocation by voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (13)

• Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition
• Reputational dynamics in spatial competition
• Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure
• Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Leadership ability and agenda choice
• Further implications of the reversion level in agenda-setter models
• EVALUATING THE SOCIAL OPTIMALITY OF DURABLE PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION USING THE HOUSING PRICE RESPONSE TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information
• Personal power dynamics in bargaining

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