Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

DOI10.2307/1884470MaRDI QIDQ3877366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Römer, Howard Rosenthal

Publication date 1979

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1884470

zbMATH Keywords

political economypublic expendituremonopoly modelreferendum votingresource allocation by voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Trade models (91B60)

Cited in

(13)

• Personal power dynamics in bargaining
• Evaluating the social optimality of durable public good provision using the housing price response to public investment
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Reputational dynamics in spatial competition
• Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information
• Further implications of the reversion level in agenda-setter models
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• Leadership ability and agenda choice
• Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly

This page was built for publication: Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3877366)