On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
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Publication:2417386
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1137-1zbMath1410.91195OpenAlexW2755729911WikidataQ129703950 ScholiaQ129703950MaRDI QIDQ2417386
Gopakumar Achuthankutty, Souvik Roy
Publication date: 12 June 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1137-1
Related Items (8)
On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules ⋮ Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences ⋮ Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains ⋮ Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains ⋮ On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ⋮ A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling ⋮ A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
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