Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
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Publication:4586044
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Cited in
(16)- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Manipulability in school choice
- On the implementation of the median
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
- Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study
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