Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
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Publication:4586044
DOI10.3982/TE1910zbMath1395.91152OpenAlexW2225080339MaRDI QIDQ4586044
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1910
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