Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01376-1zbMath1492.91224OpenAlexW3216200839MaRDI QIDQ2673787

Francois Woitrin, Benoit Decerf

Publication date: 13 June 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01376-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Properties of a measure of predictive success
• Constrained school choice
• Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation
• Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

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