Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
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Publication:4682758
DOI10.3982/TE2118zbMath1396.91120OpenAlexW2129899347MaRDI QIDQ4682758
Publication date: 19 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2118
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