Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.004zbMath1530.91161OpenAlexW4385813978MaRDI QIDQ6188243

Andreas Kleiner, Xianwen Shi, Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://openresearch.surrey.ac.uk/view/delivery/44SUR_INST/12185200930002346/13185200920002346

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationCondorcet winnerinterdependent valuessequential voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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