Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.08.004MaRDI QIDQ6188243zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://openresearch.surrey.ac.uk/view/delivery/44SUR_INST/12185200930002346/13185200920002346

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerincomplete informationinterdependent valuessequential voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Optimal voting rules
• Combinatorial voting
• An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem
• Voting under constraints
• Voting on tricky questions

Cites work

• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Herding with collective preferences
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal voting rules
• Reaching a Consensus
• Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
• Social choice and individual values
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Voting as Communicating
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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