The Limits of ex post Implementation
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Publication:3410705
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00675.xzbMath1127.91046OpenAlexW2114487161MaRDI QIDQ3410705
William R. Zame, Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu
Publication date: 30 November 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00675.x
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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