The Limits of ex post Implementation

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00675.XzbMATH Open1127.91046OpenAlexW2114487161MaRDI QIDQ3410705FDOQ3410705

Authors: Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu, William R. Zame 

Publication date: 30 November 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00675.x

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationinterdependent valuesex post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (48)

• Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
• Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Auction design with heterogeneous priors
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
• Two-person ex post implementation
• Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
• On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
• Ex-post implementation with social preferences
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Ex post implementation
• Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
• On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
• Mechanism design
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Efficient incentives with social preferences
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• The robustness of robust implementation
• Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Revealed reasoning
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

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