The Limits of ex post Implementation

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00675.XMaRDI QIDQ3410705zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu, William R. Zame

Publication date 30 November 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00675.x

zbMATH Keywords

implementationinterdependent valuesex post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(48)

• Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
• Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Auction design with heterogeneous priors
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• Two-person ex post implementation
• No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
• Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
• Ex-post implementation with social preferences
• On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Ex post implementation
• Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5997456 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
• Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• Mechanism design
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Efficient incentives with social preferences
• The robustness of robust implementation
• Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Revealed reasoning
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

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