Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0300-1MaRDI QIDQ957859zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

Publication date 1 December 2008

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0300-1

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post implementationpotentials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Ex post implementation
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Robust Mechanism Design

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• A Shapley value representation of potential games
• An Efficient Auction
• Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
• Potential games
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(12)

• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Ordinal potentials in smooth games
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

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