Robust Mechanism Design
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon's dilemma
- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
- Sensitivity and robustness of mechanism balancing.
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information
- Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
- Voting with public information
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces
- Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
- Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
- Maxmin implementation
- The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
- Random assignments and outside options
- Revealed reasoning
- New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Informational robustness of common belief in rationality
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
- Correlation-robust auction design
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- On the equivalence of optimal mechanisms with loss and disappointment aversion
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Ex-post implementation with social preferences
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
- Obvious manipulations
- Weak implementation
- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
- Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
- Understanding the dynamics of sustainable social-ecological systems: human behavior, institutions, and regulatory feedback networks
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
- Auctions in which losers set the price
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Surplus extraction with rich type spaces
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Robust firm pricing with panel data
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- Rationalizability in general situations
- On the implementation of the median
- Menu mechanisms
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
- Mechanism design and intentions
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Quasi-robust multiagent contracts
- Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
- A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
- Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Premium auctions and risk preferences: an experimental study
- Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Robust mechanism design of exchange
- Mechanism design for correlated valuations: efficient methods for revenue maximization
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Mechanism design
- Implementation theory
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Robust screening under ambiguity
- On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
- A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Mechanism design with model specification
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
- Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution
- Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs
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