Voting with public information
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- A theory of hung juries and informative voting
- An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Deliberative voting
- Dividing resources by flexible majority rules
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Game theory
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees
- Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal voting rules
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Public information and electoral bias
- Public information and social choice
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Robust Mechanism Design
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Cited in
(24)- Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives
- Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
- Information aggregation with a continuum of types
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
- A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions
- Public information and electoral bias
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Voting in small committees
- Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
- Voting on tricky questions
- Information transmission and voting
- Voting in the limelight
- Expert advice to a voting body
- Public information: relevance or salience?
- Information disclosure with many alternatives
- Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Public protests and policy making
- Subgroup deliberation and voting
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox
- Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
- Public information and social choice
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