Public information and electoral bias

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.007zbMath1197.91082OpenAlexW2045929118MaRDI QIDQ844936

Curtis R. Taylor, Hüseyin Yıldırım

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

public informationcostly votingelectoral bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (18)

Polling in a proportional representation system ⋮ Robust rational turnout ⋮ Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ Impact of information concerning the popularity of candidates on loss-averse voters' abstention ⋮ Welfare reducing polls ⋮ The welfare effects of public opinion polls ⋮ A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs ⋮ Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Welfare-improving misreported polls ⋮ Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading ⋮ Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment. ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Voting with public information ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting ⋮ Information sharing in democratic mechanisms ⋮ A passion for voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Private polling in elections and voter welfare
• Welfare reducing polls
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

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