Public information and electoral bias
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Publication:844936
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.06.007zbMATH Open1197.91082OpenAlexW2045929118MaRDI QIDQ844936FDOQ844936
Authors: Curtis R. Taylor, Huseyin Yildirim 
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.007
Recommendations
- Voting with public information
- Political disagreement and information in elections
- Public information and social choice
- Manipulated electorates and information aggregation
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Electoral competition under imperfect information
- Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
- Polarization, information collection and electoral control
- Hiding information in electoral competition.
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Large Poisson games
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Welfare reducing polls
Cited In (28)
- Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
- Pivotal persuasion
- Public information: relevance or salience?
- Robust rational turnout
- Information and targeted spending
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Voting with public information
- Media bias, slant regulation, and the public-interest media
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- A passion for voting
- The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
- Impact of information concerning the popularity of candidates on loss-averse voters' abstention
- Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
- Large elections and interim turnout
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- The welfare effects of public opinion polls
- Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
- Welfare-improving misreported polls
- Welfare reducing polls
- Razor-thin mass elections with high turnout
- Ties
- Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading
- Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment.
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- Turnout and closeness: evidence from 60 years of Bavarian mayoral elections
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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