Information and targeted spending

DOI10.3982/TE2508zbMATH Open1422.91256OpenAlexW2891417940MaRDI QIDQ5225079FDOQ5225079

Authors: Jon X. Eguia, Antonio Nicolò 

Publication date: 19 July 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2508

Recommendations

• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
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• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Electoral competition with strategic disclosure

zbMATH Keywords

informationelectionslocal public goodstargeted spending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Sequential Equilibria
• Electoral competition under imperfect information
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
• Transparency and economic policy
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
• Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
• The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities
• Political Centralization and Government Accountability *

Cited In (4)

• Enforcement missions: targets vs budgets
• Transparency and economic policy
• Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
• Electoral Systems and Public Spending

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