Information and targeted spending

DOI10.3982/TE2508zbMath1422.91256OpenAlexW2891417940MaRDI QIDQ5225079

Jon X. Eguia, Antonio Nicolò

Publication date: 19 July 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2508

zbMATH Keywords

electionsinformationlocal public goodstargeted spending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items

Electoral competition with strategic disclosure

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