Information and targeted spending

DOI10.3982/TE2508MaRDI QIDQ5225079zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jon X. Eguia, Antonio Nicolò

Publication date 19 July 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2508

zbMATH Keywords

informationelectionslocal public goodstargeted spending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
• Public information and electoral bias
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Electoral competition with strategic disclosure

Cites work

• Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Electoral competition under imperfect information
• Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Political Centralization and Government Accountability *
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Sequential Equilibria
• Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities
• The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
• Transparency and economic policy

Cited in

(4)

• Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
• Enforcement missions: targets vs budgets
• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
• Transparency and economic policy

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