Pandering and electoral competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2442833
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.006zbMATH Open1290.91052OpenAlexW3124857828MaRDI QIDQ2442833FDOQ2442833
Authors: Gabriele Gratton 
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2012-22.pdf
Recommendations
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- Electoral competition under imperfect information
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
- Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
- Political competition between differentiated candidates
Cites Work
- Sequential Equilibria
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- Large Poisson games
- Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
- Electoral competition under imperfect information
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Deliberative voting
- Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
- Voting as Communicating
- A signaling model of repeated elections
- Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
- Hiding information in electoral competition.
- Polarization and Inefficient Policies
- Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
Cited In (15)
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
- Electoral competition under imperfect information
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
- Information and targeted spending
- Deliberative democracy and electoral competition
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
- Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
- Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
- Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
- Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
- Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting
- Political Advertising and Election Results*
This page was built for publication: Pandering and electoral competition
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2442833)
