Pandering and electoral competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2442833
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.006zbMath1290.91052MaRDI QIDQ2442833
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2012-22.pdf
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